Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 75

Issue 3

Article 6

2010

The National Mediation Board's Rule Proposal for Representation
Elections: If It Ain't Broke...
Kyle Burke

Recommended Citation
Kyle Burke, The National Mediation Board's Rule Proposal for Representation Elections: If It Ain't Broke...,
75 J. AIR L. & COM. 669 (2010)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol75/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD'S RULE PROPOSAL
FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: IF IT
AIN'T BROKE ...
KYLE BURKE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

the National Mediation Board
SEVENTY-FIVE
served as a neutral third party for railor Board) hasYEARS,
(NMB
FOR
road and airline carriers and their employees during labor disputes.' The 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act (RLA
or Act) created the Board and charged it with the duty to investigate and certify an exclusive employee representative during
collective bargaining with employers over wages, rules, and
working conditions.2 The RLA granted the Board authority to
investigate representation disputes through the use of secret balloting of employees, or by any other appropriate means necessary in the Board's exercise of its discretion.3 Since its
inception, the Board has conducted secret-ballot elections
among employees and has required that at least a majority of
employees must cast valid ballots in favor of union representation before certifying any union as the exclusive employee representative.4 The Board has historically justified these
procedures on the grounds that unions could better negotiate
for employees when supported by at least a majority of eligible
voters. 5
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2010; M.S., Biology, Southwest Texas State University, 2003; B.S., Texas A&M
University, Wildlife and Fisheries Sciences, 1999. The author would like to thank
his family and friends for their support.
I See generally National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure,
74 Fed. Reg. 56,750, 56,751 (proposed Nov. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1202.4) [hereinafter NMB Proposal].
2 See generally Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 73-442, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (recodified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (2006)).
3 Id.
4 NMB Proposal, supra note 1.
5 Id. at 56,753.
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On November 3, 2009, the Board published a proposal to
change its union certification procedures so that participation
by a majority of eligible voters would no longer be required.6
Under the new rule, the Board would certify a union receiving a
simple majority of votes cast as the employees' exclusive representative.' The Board has justified this rule change on the basis
of its authority to reasonably interpret the RIA and by its assertion that labor relations in the rail and airline industries have
changed such that the current procedures are no longer applicable.8 This change will no doubt remove a hurdle for representative certification and make unionization much easier for
railroad and airline employees. Not surprisingly, many industry
employees favor the rule change, while their employers and the
Board's Chairman herself strongly oppose such a departure
from long-established precedent.'
The language of the RLA and a history of judicial deference
to the Board's decisions strongly suggest that the Board has the
authority to change its election rules."o But any rule change by
an administrative agency necessitates an adequate justification
by that agency for its departure from established practices." In
fact, the Board itself has recognized that it should deviate from
established procedures only when required by statute or when it
is essential to the administration of the RIA.' The current
Board has not adequately justified its rule change proposal.
Board decisions as recent as 2008 reiterated the importance of,
and adherence to, the majority participation requirement.1 3
And the Board has not established that labor relations have
changed so dramatically as to justify a rule change. Two newlyappointed members of the Board drafted the proposed rule after a request from major unions, hinting that partisan politics
influenced the Board's decision.'" Even if partisanship is not
behind the proposal, its appearance threatens to undermine the
legitimacy, authority, and neutrality of an important governmental body. This specter of partisanship only serves to stifle
6

Id. at 56,750.

7 Id.

Id. at 56,751-52.
9 See generally id.
10 See infra, Part III.E-F.
11Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,
808 (1973).
12 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 14 N.M.B. 347, 356 (1987).
13 Delta Air Lines, Inc., 35 N.M.B. 129 (2008).
14 See Editorial, Obama Union Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2009, at A14.
8
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the goals of the RIA-the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
and the elimination of interstate commerce interruptions."
Part II of this comment discusses the relevant historical background of the RLA, including the effects of World War I, postwar legislation, and the eventual enactment of the RLA in 1926
and subsequent creation of the Board in 1934. Part III follows
with an in-depth analysis of the Board's duties and functions
under the RLA, including how the Board has interpreted the
Act and carried out its duty to investigate representation disputes through the use of secret elections. Part III also examines
the judicial deference granted to the Board throughout its history. Part IV looks at the Board's power to change its rules and
the procedures required to justify its rule changes. This comment also addresses the Board's proffered reasons for the new
rule and why those reasons fall short of justifying the change.
Part V ultimately concludes that the proposed rule threatens the
goals of the RLA because the appearance of partisanship destroys the Board's legitimacy as a neutral fact-finder.
II.

A.

PosT-WAR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
LEGISLATION AND THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
OF 1926

The RIA and the Board resulted in part from World War 1.16
During that national emergency, the U.S. government took control over the railroads, an event which improved working conditions and wages for railroad employees." Railroad labor
became better organized through unionization that increased
employees' power through collective bargaining.' After the
War, debate raged over whether the railroads should be returned to private ownership or held by the federal government;
instead, the Transportation Act of 192019 established a middle
ground between these positions. 20 The government returned
railroad ownership to private interests but the railroads were
under increased governmental control.21 The Transportation
Act encouraged railroad management and labor to meet and
15

Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, 48 Stat. 1185, 1186-87 (1934).

16 WILLIAM E. THOMS & FRANK

J.

DOOLEY, AIRLINE LABOR LAw: THE RAJLWAY

LABOR ACT AND AVIATION AFTER DEREGULATION

2

(1990).

17 Id. at 3.
18 Id.

19 Pub. L. No. 66-152, § 407, 41 Stat. 456,
THOMS & DOOLEY, supra note 16, at 3.

20

21 Id.

481 (1920).
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settle their disputes among themselves.2 2 When private settlement failed, the parties referred the dispute to the newly created Railroad Boards of Labor Adjustment and Railroad Labor
Board.2 3 Though the Act's framers thought referral to a governmental oversight board would provide final dispute resolution,
such was not the case after the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Railroad Labor Board.2 ' There, the
Court determined that the Labor Board did not have the power
to enforce its decisions:
The jurisdiction of the Board to direct the parties to do what it
deems they should do is not to be limited by their constitutional
or legal right to refuse to do it. Under the act there is no constraint

upon them to do what the Board decides they should do except the
moral constraint, already mentioned, of publication of its
decision.25
The Transportation Act thus had no real teeth and failed to
meet its goals of fostering dispute resolution among railroad labor and management and maintaining the smooth flow of commerce throughout the United States. 6 Congress itself
recognized the Transportation Act's shortcomings during the
introduction of the bill that would become the Railway Labor
Act.27 Because railway carriers constituted the primary means
for transporting goods and people in interstate commerce, disruptions due to labor-management disputes could, and sometimes did, bring the national economy to a standstill."
In 1926 Congress attempted to secure more efficient and
peaceful means for settling labor disputes while reducing
strikes, lockouts, and other self-help remedies that were the
norm.29 Congress recognized that labor-management disagreements involving contract fairness were a major source of labor
strikes and the courts did not provide efficient or informed set22

§ 301, 41 Stat. at 469.
§§ 301, 303, 307.

23

Id.

24

261 U.S. 72 (1923).

25

Id. at 84 (emphasis added).

THOMs & DOOLEY, supra note 16, at 3.
27 H.R. REP. No. 69-328, at 2 (1926), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR AcT, As AMENDED (1926 THROUGH 1966), at 48 (1974) (quoting
26

the Democratic platform of 1924: "The labor provisions of the act (transportation
act, 1920) have proven unsatisfactory in settling differences between employer
and employee. It must therefore be so rewritten so that the high purposes which
the public welfare demands may be accomplished.").
28 O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977).
29 Id.
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tiements of those disputes.3 ' Railroad executives and railroad
labor unions worked jointly to draft and present a bill that
would create a mechanism for the speedy and peaceful settlement of disputes that might otherwise disrupt railroad service
and interstate commerce. 3 ' The bill passed easily in the House
and Senate12 and became the Railway Labor Act on May 20,
1926." Section 2 outlined the major purposes of the Act:
1. to avoid interruptions of service and commerce based on disputes between carriers and employees;
2. to encourage dispute settlement by conferences between the
representatives of carriers and employees;
3. to provide employees freedom to join labor organizations;
4. to provide both parties a means for independent selforganization;
5. to provide for the prompt settlement of disputes involving
rates of pay, work rules, or working conditions; and
6. to provide for the prompt settlement of grievances arising
from existing contracts.
Like the Transportation Act of 1920, the RLA encouraged labor and management parties first to attempt dispute settlement
in private conferences between themselves.35 The RLA created
two classes of disputes: "major" and "minor.""" Major disputes
involved contested contract issues such as wages, working conditions, and work rules, while minor disputes involved grievances
arising out of existing labor contracts.37 The RLA, by encouraging preliminary private conferences, still relied on carriers and
employees to settle their major disputes through collective
bargaining.
The procedural mechanisms of the RLA were triggered only
when the employers and labor could not come to an agreement.3 9 The interested parties referred minor disputes not setId.
31THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD & CHARLES M. REHMUS, THE NATIONAL ME-

30

DIATION

BOARD

AT 50: ITS IMPACT ON RAILROAD AND AIRLINE LABOR DisPuTs

4

(1984).
32

Id.

Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (recodified at 45 U.S.C. § 151
(2006)).
34 Id. at 577-78 (recodified at 45 U.S.C. § 151a); NMB & REHMUS, supra note
31, at 4; THOMS & DooLEY, supra note 16, at 5.
3 § 2, Second, 44 Stat. at 578.
3

36

THOMS & DOOLEY, supra note 16, at 5.

Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
3
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tied in conference to Boards of Adjustment. 40 These boards
were created by written agreement between management and
employees and were composed of an equal number of representatives from each party." Decisions by the adjustment
boards were binding on the parties to the minor disputes. 4 2
While the framers of the RLA may have aspired to create an
effective mechanism for settling minor disputes through adjustment boards, this did not happen because the RLA did not require parties to agree on national adjustment boards, but
allowed them to favor local labor unions. 4 3 These local unions
were often company owned and thus more favorable to company interests.4 4 Railroad carriers could negotiate with the local, company-owned and company-biased labor unions to settle
disputes, effectively locking out the national trade unions. 5
This strategy effectively vitiated the Act's goals to promote employees' freedom to associate and choose their labor representatives without influence from the railroad carrier.4 6 The RLA
provided neither an effective enforcement scheme, nor penalties against carriers that sought to deny employees' freedom of
association mandated by the Act itself.47
While the RLA of 1926 failed to foster minor dispute settlement, the Act did help resolve major disputes regarding wages,
work rules, and working conditions.4 8 In addition to the Boards
of Adjustment, the RLA also created the Board of Mediation to
help administer the statute.4 9 When disputes arose involving
proposed changes in wages, work rules, or working conditions,
either labor or management could invoke the help of the Board
of Mediation.5 0 The statute commanded the Board of Mediation to bring the parties to agreement through mediation, and
when mediation failed, it had a further duty to encourage the
parties to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.5 ' Beyond major disputes, it also had authority to hear disputes aris40 § 3, First, 44 Stat. at 578-79.
41

Id.

42

Id.

NMB & REHMUs, supra note 31, at 5.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
4 Id. at 6.
48 NMB & REHMUs, supra note 31, at 5.

4

49
50

Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, § 4, First, 44 Stat. 577, 579 (1926).
Id. § 5, First.

51 Id.
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ing from grievances not settled by an adjustment board and any
other dispute not settled by the parties' private conferences. 5 2
The new Board of Mediation had marked success during its
early years in settling disagreements over new labor contract
terms, and railroad strikes were limited both in number and national impact." Though the Board of Mediation was no doubt
important in dispute settlement, the onset of the Great Depression also created incentives for labor and management to
quickly and peaceably settle their differences."
B.
1.

THE

1934

AMENDMENTS TO THE

1UA

General Provisions

The 1926 Railway Labor Act proved ineffectual in resolving
"minor" disputes and providing complete decisional autonomy
for employees when unionizing.55 In early 1934, railroad carrier
and labor union representatives worked together to submit a bill
to Congress to address the shortcomings of the 1926 Act, and on
June 21, Congress passed the 1934 Amendments to the RLA.16
Congress recognized that company-maintained railroad unions
and the carriers' refusal to recognize the authority of employeedesignated representatives stymied the objectives of the RLA."
Section 2, Fourth, of the Act granted an affirmative right to employees to "organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."5" The Act forbade carriers from
interfering with employee organizations or coercing employees
52

Id.

5

NMB &

REHMuS,

supra note 31, at 5.

54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 6.

57 Report of H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, No. 1944, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 ("[The Act] forbids the use of the carriers' funds to maintain, aid, or control the labor organizations of the employees and specifically
prohibits carrier managements from requiring employees . . . to join company
unions."). Id. Regarding employee selection of their representatives, the House
Report continued:
These rights of the employees under the present act are denied by
railway managements by their disputing the authority of the freely
chosen representatives of the employees to represent them. A considerable number of railway managements maintain company unions, under the control of the officers of the carriers, and pay the
salary of the employees' representatives, a practice that is clearly
contrary to the purpose of the present Railway Labor Act.

Id.
5

Pub. L. No. 73-442,

§ 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187 (1934).
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to 'join or remain members of any labor organization."" This
language effectively curtailed company-owned, -sponsored, or dominated unions.6 0 Section 2, Fifth, of the Act recognized the
importance of employee unionization by outlawing "yellow dog"
contracts-agreements by prospective employees not to join a
labor union if hired by the employer." The amendments also
barred both labor and management from interfering in the designation of either party's bargaining representatives. 62 But perhaps the most important addition to the Act came in section 2,
Tenth. That section imposed criminal penalties against the carrier for its willful failure to comply with certain portions of the
Act, notably:
1. interference with designation of bargaining representation;
2. interference with employees' right to organize;
3. coercing employees to join or remain members of certain
labor unions; and
4. demanding or enforcing yellow dog contracts. 3
This section gave the RLA the teeth that its 1926 counterpart
and the Transportation Act of 1920 lacked. When violations of
the Act occurred, employee representatives could now invoke
the U.S. Attorney General and the court system to compel employer compliance.6 4
2.

Creation of the National Mediation Board

The 1934 amendments to the RLA abolished the Board of
Mediation and established a new executive agency, the National
Mediation Board, to take its place.65 The Act reduced board
membership from five members to three, to be appointed by the
President, and only two could be of the same political party. 66
As with the original Board of Mediation, both labor and management had the right to invoke the services of the NMB in settling certain disputes.
59 Id.
supra note 31,

60

NMB & REHMUS,

61

§ 2, Fifth, 48 Stat. at 1188.
Id. § 2, Third.
Id. § 2, Tenth.

62

63
- Id.
65

Id. § 4, First.

66

Id.

67

Id. § 5, First.

at

6.
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Whereas the Board of Mediation dealt with grievance disputes
not settled by the earlier Boards of Adjustment, the new NMB's
duty focused on major disputes concerning changes in rates of
pay, work rules, or working conditions, leaving minor disputes
to the newly created National Railroad Adjustment Board. 8 As
with the 1926 Act, the 1934 amendments placed a duty upon the
NMB to use its best efforts to bring carriers and employees to
agreement through mediation of their disputes. 69 When mediation failed, the NMB had the duty to encourage the parties to
enter arbitration, with the added proviso that if the parties refused to arbitrate, neither party could change the status quo regarding wages, rules, work conditions, or established practices
for thirty days.7
The amendments gave the NMB one new but significant responsibility: to settle disputes among the carrier's employees
concerning their representation during bargaining under the
RLA.7 1 The Act directed the NMB, at the request of either labor
or management, to "investigate such dispute and to certify to
both parties ... the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent
the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to
the carrier."7 2 As part of investigating employee representation
disputes, the Act granted the NMB authority to hold elections or
use other means to determine the employees' choice for repreThe Act also gave the NMB power to determine
sentation.
who could participate in elections and the power to establish
rules to govern the representation elections.
Once the NMB
certifies the employees' representatives to the carrier, that employer must treat those representatives as the exclusive bargaining unit for purposes of the RLA.x
6%

Id.

69

Id.

70 Id.
71 Id.
72

§ 2, Ninth; NMB & REHMUS, supra note 31, at 7.
§ 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. at 1188.

7 Id. ("In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to
take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate
method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the
employees without interference, influence or coercion exercised by the
carrier.").
7 Id.
75

Id.

The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the
employer and employees, but it does command those preliminary

678
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RLA

The RLA had proven successful in resolving labor disputes
and protecting commerce in the railroad industry, and Congress
recognized that the RLA could (and should) be extended to
cover the airline industry.76 Up until the mid- to late-1920s,
America's people and its goods traveled primarily by rail, but
the successes of air mail transport and the development of better navigational aids foreshadowed the growth of the commercial airline industry. 7 Congress recognized the emerging
importance of airlines to the efficient flow of interstate commerce and decided that the public needed protections against
interruptions of that service.7 ' To that end, Congress amended
the RLA in April 1936 to cover common carriers by air, U.S.
mail carriers, and pilots employed by either.
III.

A.

THE ROLE OF THE

CURRENT LAW

NMB

IN REPRESENTATION DISPUTES

The RLA Amendments of 1934 charged the NMB with the
duty to investigate representative disputes among a carrier's employees.o A representation dispute typically occurs in two types
of situations: (1) the employees are not currently represented by
any labor union, and aspiring unions request a vote to determine if employees wish to unionize, or (2) the employees are
currently represented by a union, but another union wishes to
replace or challenge the validity of the incumbent." In both
steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make
reasonable effort to compose differences-in short, to enter into a
negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by § 2, First. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515,
548 (1937).
76 THOMs & DOOLEY, supra note 31, at 9.

7 Id. at 6-7.
78 Id. at 9.

79 Pub. L. No. 74-487, § 201, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936).
80 Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1188 (1934) (recodified at 45
U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (2006)) ("If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this Act, it shall be the duty of the
Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such

dispute . . . .").
81 See generally NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD REPRESENTATION MANuAL (revised
Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter NMB MANUAL], available at http://www.nmb.gov/representation/representation-manual.pdf.
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situations, the carrier, employees, or labor union can request
the help of the NMB to determine what union, if any, will represent the employees."
The NMB has promulgated a variety of rules to govern representation disputes, and before the NMB gets involved, a minimum number of employees must request or authorize the
investigation.8 3 Where the employees are not currently represented by any labor organization, at least thirty-five percent of
the employees in the craft must authorize the Board's investigation;84 if the employees are currently represented, at least a majority of those employees must authorize the investigation." A
"craft" or "class" is a set or subset of employees pooled together
with common interests such that it would be logical and fair for
the same union to represent them.86 For example, in the airline
industry, one craft might include pilots and flight engineers,
while another craft might include flight attendants, and yet another might include mechanics. Once a craft or class accumulates the required number of employee authorizations, the NMB
must investigate the dispute.
The NMB typically begins the investigation by requesting employee information from the carrier, who is required to provide
such information to the NMB for purposes of its investigative
function under the RIA.* The Board analyzes the employee
information to determine which employees should be included
in the class or craft and which employees should be allowed to
vote if an election is held." Where disputes arise concerning
the makeup of the craft, the Board makes the final determination of the appropriate craft and its membership.9 o After the
Board has determined the appropriate class for the election and
the eligible voters, the Board sends notification of a scheduled
election with voting times to the eligible voters."

82
83
8

85

§ 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. at 1188.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1201-1209 (2010).
Id.
Id.

§ 1206.2(b).
§ 1206.2(a).

86 NMB MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9.1.
87 § 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. at 1188.
88

Id.; 29 C.F.R.

§ 1202.6.

89 29 C.F.R. § 1202.5.
90 Id.

§ 1202.8.

91 NMB MANUAL, supra note 81, § 13.201
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COUNTING THE VOTES-MAJOIuTY RULE

The Board currently conducts elections through telephone,
internet, and mailed-ballot voting." The Board lists the union
candidates on the ballot in a specific order, with the incumbent
listed first, then challengers, then intervenors." Ballots also
provide a space for write-in candidates." The Board only counts
valid ballots toward representation "where the voter's intent to
vote for representation is clear."" While the ballot provides
space for representation candidates, there is no choice to vote
"no," "no union," or "no representation."9 6 In fact, should a
voter write-in a "no" or "no union" type vote, the ballot is consid-

ered void and not included toward a vote for representation.
Soon after the election, the Board tallies the votes to determine the employees' choice, if any, for union representation.
The RLA commands that "[t] he majority of any craft or class of
employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the
representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter."" Since its inception in 1934, the Board has interpreted
this language to mean that at least a majority of eligible voters in
the craft must cast valid ballots in favor of representation. 99 If a
majority of voters do cast valid ballots, they will have voted, as a
whole, for representation, and eligible employees who do not
vote become "no" votes, or votes against representation. 0 0
Though a majority of voters may have cast valid ballots in
favor of representation, the Board will not certify a union as a
representative unless that union also received a majority of the
Id. §§ 13.0-14.0.
93 Id. §§ 13.204, 14.201. Local or national labor organizations, corporations,
or any person or groups of persons may represent a craft of employees for purposes of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 151, Sixth (2006). The RIA does not require that
the employee representatives be employed by the carrier in question. Id. § 152,
Third.
94 NMB MANUAL, supra note 81, §§ 13.304-1, 14.305-2.
95 Id.
96 Id. §§ 13.204, 14.201.
97 Id. §§ 13.304-2, 14.305-3 (Void ballot/votes also consist of: (1) votes for a
carrier or carrier official; (2) votes that select more than one candidate, or otherwise fail to indicate a voter's intent; (3) blank ballots; (4) votes for "self' or "self
representation"; and (5) ballots that identify the individual voter.).
98 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth.
99 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,751. "If there is a majority of votes for
representation generally, the organization or individual receiving a majority of
NMB
votes cast for representation will be certified as the representative ......
MANUAL, supra note 81, §§ 13.304-1, 14.305-2.
100 See generally NMB Proposal, supra note 1.
92

2010]
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votes actually cast. 01 And, if a majority of eligible voters cast
votes for at least some representation, it is possible for a union
to win the election, even where a majority of the class did not
vote for that particular union.10 2
The NMB has followed the majority participation rule for over
seventy-five years. In re Representationof Employees of the Pan American Airways, Inc. - Radio Operators and Teletype Operators'0o illustrates the application of the rule during the Board's formative
years. There, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees represented Pan Am's teletype operators, while the radio operators
remained unorganized.10 4 The Radio Officers' Union, C.T.U.,
A.F.L. wished to represent both the teletype and radio operators, and invoked the services of the NMB under section 2,
Ninth, of the RLA. 0 5 The Board determined a dispute existed
and that 183 employees were eligible to vote in its representation election. 0 6 Employees cast sixty-nine votes in favor of the
Radio Officers' Union, some twenty-three votes short of the
ninety-two required for a showing of majority interest in representation.' 7 Since a majority of eligible employees had not cast
valid ballots, the Board refused to certify the Radio Officers'
Union as a representative, even though it had won a clear majority of votes cast.' 0s
In its decision, the Board noted that its policy had been seriously challenged by several parties, and the Board even invoked
the advice of the Attorney General before rendering its judgment.'0 9 Ultimately, the Board stuck to its precedent and argued that the majority participation policy helped further the
goals of the RLA." 0o The Board noted the carriers' and employees' duty to settle disputes and avoid interruption of commerce:
MANUAL, supra note 81, § 14.305-2.
Id. § 13.304-1 ("[T]he organization or individual receiving a majority of
votes cast for representation will be certified as the representative even if that
individual or organization did not receive votes from a majority of the craft or
class.").
103 1 N.M.B. 454 (1948).
104 Id. at 454.

101 NMB
102

105 Id.
106 Id.

Id. (The Brotherhood declined to participate in the representation determination and was not listed on the ballots. Seventeen ballots were void.).
107

108 Id. at 455.

10 Id. at 454-55.
110 Id.

682
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"The Board is of the opinion that this duty can more readily be
fulfilled and stable relations maintained by carriers' and employees' representatives by a requirement that a majority of eligible
employees cast valid ballots in elections conducted under the
Act before certifications of employee representatives are issued.""' The Board has steadfastly applied its rule in standard
employee representation disputes." 2
It is important to note that valid votes and ballots cast for different unions may be pooled in order to reach the majority participation threshold. 1 3 During a representation dispute among
certain employees of Aspen Airways, the Board determined that
142 employees were eligible to vote in the certification election.1 4 A write-in candidate received fifty-four votes, well short
of the seventy-two for a majority, but employees cast thirty-nine
votes for two other labor organizations."' As part of its standard
procedure, the Board pooled the votes of all three union candidates (ninety-three total votes) to reach the majority threshold
requirement and then certified the write-in candidate as the employees' representative.'
Aspen Airways also illustrates the importance of a write-in option on the NMB's ballots and the
impact a write-in candidate can have on employee
representation.
C.

VARIATIONS ON THE

MAJOIUTY

RULE

When special circumstances warrant, the NMB modifies its
employee representation election procedures. Where no labor
111Id. at 455; see also Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 14 N.M.B.
347, 362 (1987) ("A union without majority support cannot be as effective in
negotiations as a union selected by a process which assures that a majority of
employees desire representation.").
112 E.g., W. N.Y. & Pa. R.R., LLC - Train & Engine Serv. Emps., 36 N.M.B. 18
(2008) (union certified after majority of eligible voters participated); Frontier
Airlines, Inc. - Stock Clerks, 31 N.M.B. 460 (2004) (application dismissed after
less than majority of eligible employees voted for representation); Am. W. Airways, Inc. - Stock Clerks, 26 N.M.B. 499 (1999) (union certified after majority of
eligible voters participated). A survey of 43 representation elections conducted
by the NMB during fiscal year 2009 demonstrated that in 27 of those elections, at
least a majority of eligible voters cast valid ballots for representation. Fiscal Year
2009 NMB Determinations- Sorted by Citation, NMB, http://www.nmb.gov/representation/deter2009/fy09cite.html) (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
us Aspen Airways, Inc. - Fleet and Passenger Serv. Emps., 8 N.M.B. 274
(1981).
114 Id. at 275.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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organization captures a majority of votes cast or a tie occurs, the
Board may hold a runoff election."' Part 1206.1 dictates that
the Board must hold a runoff election when requested by a candidate who is entitled to appear on the runoff ballot.' 1 8 In these
elections, the ballot contains only the names of the two labor
organization that received the highest number of votes in the
general election, and the ballot provides no space for write-in
candidates.'o The Board certifies the candidate that received
the simple majority of votes cast in the runoff election, regardless of whether a majority of total eligible voters cast valid ballots
in that election.12 0 At least a majority of eligible voters must
have cast valid ballots in the first election that produced a tie or
failed to produce a majority winner.121
The Board also modifies its elections procedures during instances of carrier interference.12 2 The RLA mandates that employees choose their representatives without interference or
influence from their employers. 123 In Laker, the Teamsters solicited the services of the NMB to determine the exclusive representative of Laker Airways employees, and the Board held an
election by secret mailed ballots.124 However, during the election, the Teamsters alleged that Laker Airways had illegally coerced employees not to vote and had otherwise interfered with
the representation election.1 2 1 Upon investigation, the Board
found that Laker Airways had encouraged employees not to
vote, instructed them to turn their ballots into Laker rather than
the Board, tracked employees who had received ballots, asked
for names of employees requesting duplicate ballots, and
granted a significant pay increase just before the election to discourage unionization.' 2 1
117 29 C.F.R. § 1206.1 (2010).
11RId. § 1206.1 (a).
119 Id. § 1206.1(b).
120 NMB MANUAL, supra note 81, § 16.0.
121 Id.; see USAir, Inc. - Fleet Serv. Emps., 21 N.M.B. 385 (1994).
122 E.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Laker), 8 N.M.B. 236 (1981).
123 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (2010) ("No carrier, its officers or agents, shall
deny or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or assist
in organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for
any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees . . . or to
influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or
not to join or remain members of any labor organization.
).
124 Laker 8 N.M.B. at 236.
125

Id.

126

Id. at 240-43.
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Laker's activities appalled the Board, who declared that new
methods had to be employed during the representation elections.1 The Board mandated a ballot-box type election and
clarified that "the desires of the majority of those actually casting valid ballots will determine the outcome of the elections,
whether or not a majority of those eligible participate in the
12
The Board noted though that its decision to modelections."s
scheme was solely in response to Laker's violathe
election
ify
tions of the RLA and was not meant to change the precedent of
requiring majority participation in normal representative
elections. 121
The Board approved another election procedure in Key Airlines, where the Board found that the carrier had a history of
coercing employees and discouraging unionization through
meetings, firings, and disparate pay raises."' The Board also acknowledged that the Laker-type ballot would not be effective because Key's repeated conduct had damaged the employees'
sense of freedom to elect union representation."' Therefore,
the Board ordered a new election in which the Teamsters would
be certified unless a majority of eligible voters returned valid
ballots opposing Teamster representation.13 2 A "Key" election,
then, is an extreme measure where the normal election procedure is essentially reversed, and it allows union certification
without obtaining majority support.
D.

DECERTIFICATION

Once the NMB certifies a union as the employee representative to the carrier, that certification remains in effect until the
Board issues another certification or dismissal regarding that
127 Id. at 244 ("The Board views Laker's admitted conduct as among the most
egregious violations of employee rights in memory. Rarely has a carrier waged
such a deliberate campaign designed to override employee free exercise of the
rights guaranteed by the Act. Extraordinary remedies are required to overcome
Laker's violations and to restore conditions which will permit a free election.").
128 Id. at 256-57. In such "Laker" elections, the ballot simply inquires whether
the employee wishes to be represented by the candidate union and provides "yes"
and "no" check boxes. The ballot provides no space for write-in votes. Application of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters - Airline Div. (Key Airlines), 16 N.M.B. 296, 297
n.1 (1989).
129 Laker, 8 N.M.B. at 257.
130 Key Airlines, 16 N.M.B. at 307-12.
131 Id. at 311-12.
132 Id. at 312.
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craft or class.' 3 Neither the RLA nor the Board's procedure
explicitly provides a mechanism for decertifying a union previously elected by employees.' 3 4 However, a union can lose its status as a class representative through "de facto" decertification.s 5
In Alitalia, a prospective union challenged the incumbent
union's right to represent the office clerical employees of Alitalia Airlines.'1 6 The Board held an election in which less than
a majority of eligible employees voted for representation by either union.1 3 7 Consequently, the Board held that the incumbent union had lost its certification and its right to represent the
The Board based its decision on its history of reemployees.'
quiring majority participation, while citing to a D.C. Circuit
opinion that recognized employees' right to reject collective
representation. 3 9 Unsatisfied with de facto decertification,
some unions have asked the Board to promulgate an explicit
decertification procedure. 4 0 The Board declined to issue such
a procedure, finding "no persuasive evidence or argument that
decertification procedures are mandated by the Railway Labor
Act.""' The Board noted that "formal decertification rules"
were not essential to the Board's functions in representation disputes, as employees had alternative avenues to terminate

representation.142
NMB MANUAL, supra note 81, § 15.1.
See generally 45 U.S.C. § 152; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1202, 1206 (2010); NMB MANUAL,
supra note 81.
135 See Alitalia Airlines/IAM & AW (Alitalia Airlines), 10 N.M.B. 331 (1983).
136 Id. at 331.
133
134

137

Id.

Id. at 332.
Id. at 331-32 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). In Steamship Clerks, the court reasoned
that "it is inconceivable that the right to reject collective representation vanishes
entirely if the employees of a unit once choose collective representation." Steamship Clerks, 402 F.2d at 202. The court continued:
The Board has in the past refused to certify a representative, when
an election among unorganized employees failed to elicit the votes
of 50% of the employees, without any hue and cry that employees
must be represented so that the negotiations contemplated by the
Act may go on. The Board may not only decline to certify a representative, but may go further and certify that there is no
representative.
Id. at 202-03.
-4o Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 14 N.M.B. 347, 347 (1987).
141 Id. at 358.
138

139

142

Id.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION REGARDING

MAJORITY PARTICIPATION
Given the Board's long history, it is not surprising that many
carriers, unions, and employees have filed suit against the NMB
in its handling of representation disputes.1 4 Just a few years after the 1934 creation of the Board, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to settle a dispute over the RLA and the validity of the Board's election procedure. 1 " In Virginian Railways,
the Board held an election to determine the appropriate representative for the railway's employees and subsequently certified
the Federation as the duly elected representative. 1 4 5 The carrier
refused to recognize the Federation as the employees' representative, propped up a local company union, and coerced employees not to affiliate with any organization other than the
company union. 6 The Federation brought suit and secured an
injunction to compel the railway to recognize Federation as the
elected representative and to enjoin the company from coercing
and influencing employees from freely exercising their right to
organize.' 4 1 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the railway attacked the enforceability and constitutionality of the RIA and
the validity of the Board's certification procedures. 1 48 After affirming the constitutionality and enforceability of the RLA, the
Court examined how the Board conducted its representative
elections.'
In particular, the railway attacked the certification
of the blacksmith craft, asserting that because a majority of eligible voters had not voted for the Federation, the Board's certification was invalid.15 0 The Court disagreed, noting that at least a
majority of eligible voters had participated in the election and
the Federation had received the majority of the votes actually

143 E.g., Zantop Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 732 F.2d 517 (6th
Cir. 1984); Russell v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1983); Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 380 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Bhd. of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Ass'n for the Benefit of Non-Contract Emps., 380 U.S. 650
(1965).
144 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
145 Id. at 539.
146 Id. at 539-40.
147 Id. at 540-41.
148 Id. at 542-62.
149 Id. at 559.
150 Id. at 559-60.
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cast."' 1 The Court first examined the language of section 2,
Fourth, of the RLA'5 2 and held:
It is to be noted that the words of the section confer the right of
determination upon a majority of those eligible to vote, but is
silent as to the manner in which that right shall be exercised.
Election laws providing for approval of a proposal by a specified
majority of an electorate have been generally construed as requiring only the consent of the specified majority of those participating in the election."'
The Court pointed out how difficult certification would be for
a union if the RLA required not only that a majority of eligible
voters participate, but also that the union receive a majority of
eligible votes. 1 4 Furthermore, an "indifferent minority" could
spoil an election and frustrate the purposes of the RLA.15 The
district court opinion showed that the Board originally scheduled an election that required the union to receive a majority of
total eligible votes but changed the procedure after receiving
complaints that the railway influenced employees not to vote."'
The district court also provided a useful analysis of section 2,
Fourth, of the RLA, noting that its majority vote requirement
was met where at least a majority of those eligible to vote participated.'15 Once that minimum was met, the Board could rightfully certify any union that received a majority of votes cast."'
The court analogized the majority rule to a corporate stockholder meeting requiring participation by a majority or quorum
of stockholders.15 9 As a corollary to this rule, the court stated
that where a majority of eligible voters had not participated in
the election, an election had not truly occurred, and thus, no
certification could be issued.16 0
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the propriety of
the Board's election procedure in AeronauticalRadio, Inc. v. NaId. at 560.
Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187 (1934) ("The majority
of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be
the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter.").
'5s Virginian Railways, 300 U.S. at 560.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 561.
157 Sys. Fed'n No. 40 v. Virginian Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 621, 628 (E.D. Va. 1935).
151
152

158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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tional Mediation Board.16 1 The Board certified the Teamsters as
the representative of a craft of Aeronautical employees, and Aeronautical filed suit seeking to have the certification invalidated. 62 During the election, a majority of employees voted for
at least some representation, and the Teamsters received a majority of the votes actually cast, though not a majority of eligible
votes.' 6' The employer attacked the Board, claiming that it had
failed to perform its duty to investigate representation disputes
under the RLA.164 Aeronautical argued that since the Teamsters had not received a majority of eligible votes, one could not
rationally conclude that they "were the choice of the majority."' 65 The court stressed that a majority of eligible voters had
cast ballots in favor of representation, and by certifying the
Teamsters, the Board had "reached a permissible conclusion.116 6
Furthermore, there was "no showing that the Board [had] failed
to perform its duty to investigate or that it [had] acted in excess
of its statutory authority. "16' The court of appeals then affirmed
the dismissal of Aeronautical's claims, holding that the court
lacked the jurisdiction to question the Board's election procedures where the Board had met its statutory obligations.' 6 8
Courts have universally affirmed the Board's majority participation rule in representation dispute elections.'16
F.

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO

NMB

PROCEDURES

Not only have courts specifically approved the Board's
method of representative certification, they have generally
161380 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
162 Id. at 625-26.
163 Id. at 626.
164 Id.
165 Id.

166 Id. at 627.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 E.g., Zantop Airlines Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 732 F.2d 517, 522
(6th Cir. 1984) ("The method of determining a majority was within the broad
discretion granted to the Board."); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ry. Emps.' Dep't,
AFL-CIO, 93 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 297 (1938)
(" [W]hen society endeavors to express its collective will to ascertain it by a majority of votes cast . .. a majority of those entitled to participate is the quorum that
validates its choice."); Ass'n of Clerical Emps. of Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry.
Sys. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 85 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1936) ("[W]here a
majority of those qualified to vote had in fact voted, a proposed representative
receiving a majority of the quorum which thus voted was the duly elected representative under the statute.").
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showed the Board incredible deference in its procedures and
decisions."'o Nine years after the Board's creation, the Supreme
Court issued a decision holding that the Board's decisions were
subject to very limited judicial review."' In Switchmen's Union of
North America v. National Mediation Board, the petitioner brought
suit to have the Board's certification of a rival union cancelled. 1 2 The complaining union asserted that the Board had
incorrectly designated which employees should be included in
the craft holding the election.17 3 The district and appellate
courts upheld the Board's decision, and the Supreme Court affirmed on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the judiciary did
not have jurisdiction to hear such complaints about the Board's
decisions.1 7 4 The Court pointed to the provisions of the RLA
that created the Board, as well as the absence of language permitting judicial review.17 5 While section 3 and section 9 of the
RLA provided judicial review of some issues, section 2 offered
no such remedy, and the Court assumed that Congress made
the distinction consciously.1 7 ' Furthermore, Congress vested
enormous power in the NMB as fact finder in representation
disputes so that "the dispute was to reach its last terminal point
when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no
dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law." 1 7
The Supreme Court reiterated the deference afforded to the
NMB by the judiciary in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks
v. Ass'n for the Benefit of Non-ContractEmployees.17 During a representation dispute for clerical and office employees of United
Airlines, the airline and the Association sued to enjoin the
Board from using a ballot that did not contain a selection for
170 E.g., Horizon Air Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 232 F.3d 1126, 1134
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915 (2001); Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'1
Mediation Bd., 119 F.2d 772, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021
(1998); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 93 F.2d at 343.

171 320

U.S. 297 (1943).

Id. at 299.
as Id.
174 Id. at 299-300.
175 Id. at 303 ("Where Congress took such great pains to protect the Mediation
Board in its handling of an explosive problem, we cannot help but believe that if
Congress had desired to implicate the federal judiciary and to place on the federal courts the burden of having the final say on any aspect of the problem, it
would have made its desire plain.").
176 Id. at 306.
177 Id. at 305.
172

178

380 U.S. 650 (1965).
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"no union."' 7 9 The parties also attacked the Board's designation
of the appropriate craft that would participate in the election.18 0
After the district court enjoined the Board from using a ballot
that did not have a "no union" option, a divided court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute."81 Turning first to the dispute over craft
designation, the Court cited and followed the precedent from
Switchmen's Union and held that the Board's designation of the
appropriate class was not to be disturbed by the courts.18 2 The
Court noted that the Board's decision would be reviewable had
it neglected its duty under the RLA to investigate representation
disputes, but the Board met its duty by using a craft long estabThe Court then turned to the
lished in its prior proceedings.'
issue of the ballot form and the lack of a "no union" selection
box, and held that the district had erred by enjoining the
Board's current ballot.18 4 The Court noted the plain language
of section 2, Ninth, of the RLA,8 5 which granted a high level of
discretion to the Board in executing representative elections:
[N]ot not only does the statute fail to spell out the form of any
ballot that might be used but it does not even require selection
by ballot. It leaves the details to the broad discretion of the
Board . .. [T]he details of selecting representatives were to be

left for the final determination of the Board.' 8 6
179 Id.

at 653.

180 Id.

at 654.
Id. at 668.
183 Id. at 665-66 ("Time and again [the Board] has acknowledged that it has
the task of determining the appropriateness of a craft or class, and nothing in
this case suggests that it abdicated that responsibility here .... This procedure
clearly complied with the statutory command that the Board 'investigate' the
dispute.").
184 Id. at 667-68. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Board decided to amend the instructions on the ballots to read: "INSTRUCTIONS FOR
VOTING. No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots, no representative will be certified." Id. at 657. The Court
noted these changes but did not base its opinion on the new ballot, since these
instructions did not change election procedures. The ballot merely "stated on its
face what has been the practice of the Board in these elections since its inception." Id.
185 Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1188 (1934) ("[T]he Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved,
or to utilize any other appropriatemethod ... and establish the rules to govern the
election.") (emphasis added)).
186 Non-Contract Emps., 380 U.S. at 668-69.
181 Id.
182
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The Court noted that ballot selection was a "necessary incident"
to the Board's investigation, and judicial inquiry into the
Board's decision was inappropriate in the absence of a statutory
violation.'
In the Board's seventy-five year history, courts have repeatedly
deferred to its decisions in representation investigations."'
Courts have exercised jurisdiction over the NMB's decisions in
two limited situations-where the Board has acted outside the
scope of its statutory authority or where a party has alleged unconstitutional action by the Board."' In Russell v. National Mediation Board,190 the court of appeals determined that the Board
failed to carry out its duty to investigate a representation dispute
among employees of Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. 191 In the hopes of ousting an incumbent union, Russellthe employees' chosen representative-submitted the required
number of authorization cards and requested that the Board inBut the Board devestigate the representational dispute."9
clined to investigate the dispute on the grounds that Russell had
no intent to actually represent the employees if he were
elected."' The Fifth Circuit held that by dismissing Russell's application, the Board had denied the employees' right to select
their representative under the RLA and thus, had failed to carry
out their statutory duty.19 4 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
set aside a rerun election held by the Board after the court determined that the Board acted unconstitutionally. 195 The Board
Id. at 669.
1ss See, e.g., Horizon Air Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 232 F.3d 1126, 1134
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915 (2001) (holding that the Board had not
acted outside its statutory duty by ordering new election after finding carrier interference); Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 119 F.3d 772, 775-76
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998) (deferring to the Board's decision to allow discharged employees to vote in a representative election, noting
that "judicial review of NMB decisions is to be extraordinarily limited"); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ry. Emps. Dep't of AFL-CIO, 93 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 649 (1938) (deferring to the Board's majority rule
and its decision to allow furloughed employees to vote).
1s9 Horizon Air, 232 F.3d at 1132.
190 714 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1983).
18

19 Id. at 1347.

Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
194 Id. at 1347 ("The Board failed here to find the fact in dispute: who is the
true representative of the employees? It is, therefore, a 'perversion of truth' for
the Board to insist that it conducted the investigation and discharged its duty
under the Act.").
195 US Airways, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 177 F.3d 985, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
192
19
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found carrier interference during the first election and subsequently prohibited carrier campaigns that would promote preexisting employee committees over the outside unions during
the period before the new election.1 9 6 The court held that the
Board's actions went too far and violated the carrier's free
speech rights.1 17 Thus, the Board's decisions are not completely
immune to judicial review.

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

THE PROPOSED RULE CHANGE

The NMB has proposed to amend 29 C.F.R. § 1202.4-the
rule describing secret ballots used in representative disputesso that the Board would certify a representative based on the
majority of valid ballots cast in the election.1 98 The proposed
rule adds the language: "Except in unusual or extraordinary circumstances, in a secret ballot the Board shall determine the
choice of representative based on the majority of valid ballots
cast."" 9 This change would eliminate the first hurdle customarily required in representative dispute elections-the requirement that a majority of eligible voters cast valid ballots in favor
of representation. There is no doubt that this procedural
change would make it easier for a labor organization to achieve
certification. The Board thus dispenses with seventy-five years of
procedural precedent. The proposal has sparked a flood of
comments supporting and opposing the change.oo Whether
Id. at 992.
197 Id. at 994.
196

NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,754. Section 1202.4 currently states:
SECRET BALLOT. In conducting such investigation, the Board is authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to
utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of
their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees
without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the
carrier.
29 C.F.R. § 1202.4 (2010).
199 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,754.
200 As ofJanuary 15, 2010, the Board had received comments, emails, and letters from U.S. Senators and Representatives, labor groups such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, carriers such as Delta and Southwest Airlines,
other employees potentially affected, and members of the public in general.
Over 2,000 emails and more than 20,000 individual, handwritten, and form letters have been sent to the Board regarding the rule change. ProposedNMB Representation Rulemaking, NMB, http://www.nmb.gov/representation/proposed-reprulemaking.html (last visited June 15, 2010).
1s
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one is for or against such a procedural change, the starting
point for analyzing the proposal is simple: does the National Mediation Board have the power to make such a significant rule
change? To answer that question, one must look to the RLA.

B. THE

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD'S

POWER TO CHANGE

ITS RULES
The 1934 Amendments to the RLA created the NMB as an
"independent agency in the executive branch of the Government."201 An administrative agency's power to make rules or
carry out policy is directly tied to the underlying statute, and the
agency cannot promulgate rules outside its enabling law. 0
Where Congress has created an agency specifically to carry out
the policy of a statute, that agency cannot fulfill its duty without
some inherent power to make rules and interpret its enabling
statute. 203 Courts make two basic inquiries when analyzing an
administrative agency's actions: whether Congress has directly
addressed the issue in question and, if Congress has not addressed the issue, whether the agency construed the statute in a
permissible manner.2 0 4
Turning to the question of whether Congress addressed the
specific issue requires a look at the language of the 1934
Amendments to the RLA. In section 2, Ninth, of the Act, Congress granted the Board power to investigate representation disputes by taking a secret ballot but did not specify the form of
ballot required, how votes would be tallied, or any other voting
particulars.2 0 5 It seems clear that Congress did not specifically
address the question of voting procedures. In fact, Congress's
language suggests that it entrusted the Board with broad discretion when investigating employee representation disputes.2 0 6
201Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 4, First, 48 Stat. 1185, 1193 (1934).
202 La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) ("[A]n agency
unless and until Congress confers power upon
literally has no power to act ..
it.").
203 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.").
204 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
205 Pub. L. No. 73-442 § 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. at 1188.
206 Id. ("[T]he Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of
the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriatemethod ... and establish
the rules to govern the election.") (emphasis added).
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Since Congress did not specifically address voting procedures,
the remaining question is whether the NMB has fairly construed
the statute in executing its duties. As the discussion in Part III
demonstrated, courts have universally recognized both the
Board's broad discretion in carrying out its investigative duties
and the limited scope ofjudicial review.2 0 7 And, given the broad
language of "establish the rules to govern the election," a
change in those rules is a reasonable interpretation of the
Board's authority under the RLA.2 0
Beyond the RLA, the Administrative Procedure Act demands
that the Board publish notice of its rules and any amendments
or changes in the Federal Register. 209 Though administrative
agencies are not required to follow their own precedent, it is
presumed that the agency's policies "will be carried out best if
the settled rule is adhered to."2 0 As a corollary to that presumption, an agency has a duty "to explain its departure from prior
norms."2 1' The agency can justify its position by asserting that
(1) circumstances have changed, (2) the rule is not applicable
to specific facts, or (3) the rule should be read more narrowly in
a particular case.2 12 But as Part III illustrates, the judiciary has
historically accorded extreme deference to the NMB in its procedural decisions.

C.

HAS THE

NMB

ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED OR JUSTIFIED THE
PROPOSED RULE CHANGE?

Statutory and case law strongly suggest that the NMB has the
power to change its rules and procedure, but has the Board acted within the scope of the RLA and adequately justified the
need for the new rule? The Board began its proposal by assertSee supra Part III.E-F.
Russell v Nat'l Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1337 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[T]he Board has clear authority to change its own procedures, so long as such
changes comply with the requirements of the Act."); see also Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Ry. Employees Dep't of AFL, 93 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 649 (1938) ("[T]he intent of the Congress was to clothe the Board with
large discretionary powers in the conduct of elections for the appointment of
representatives . . . ."); Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Ass'n for the Benefit of NonContract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1965) ("Congress has simply told the
Board to investigate and has left to it the task of selecting the methods and procedures which it should employ in each case.").
20 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) (C), (E) (2006).
210 Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,
808 (1973).
211 Id.
207
208

212
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ing its power to "reasonably interpret"213 section 2, Fourth, of
the RIA. 2 14 The Board noted that administrative concerns
prompted its original interpretation of that section, and that the
Board had authority to re-interpret the statute so that a simple
majority of those actually casting votes would be sufficient for
certification.2 " The Board cited the Virginian Railways decision
and asserted that section 2, Fourth, "confer[s] the right of determination upon a majority of those eligible to vote but is silent as
to the manner in which that right shall be exercised." 2 16 Thus,
the Board claimed that it had the power to determine what "majority" means and how to measure that majority in an election.
But the Court in Virginian Railways used the above language in a
case where a majority of eligible voters actually did participate in
the election. 217 The Court thus defined the discretion of the
Board against the backdrop of a vote legitimized by a majority of
workers.2 18
Would the Supreme Court have felt the same if a majority of
eligible voters had not participated in the initial election? And
is it correct for the current Board to extrapolate the Court's reasoning to a situation where a majority of eligible voters have not
participated? A review of the trial court's opinion in Virginian
Railways helps elucidate the answer to those questions. The trial
court noted that in all but one of the voting crafts-the carmen
and coach cleaners-a majority of eligible voters had cast valid
ballots in favor of representation. 21 9 For that craft, the court
held the certification invalid because no quorum had participated, and thus, no election by that craft had truly occurred.2 20
The Supreme Court did not address this issue because the unions did not appeal the district court's decision to invalidate the
certification of the carmen and coach cleaners. 2 2 1 The parties
themselves seem to have realized that no representative could
be legitimate when a majority of eligible voters had not particiNMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,751.
Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187 (1934) ("The majority
of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be
the representative of the craft or class for purposes of this Act.").
215 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,751 (citing the Board's 1942 Annual Report, 1 NMB ANN. REP. 19 (1942)).
216 Id. (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 560 (1937)).
217 Virginian Railways, 300 U.S. at 590.
218 See id.
219 Sys. Fed'n No. 40 v. Virginian Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 621, 626 (E.D. Va. 1935).
220 Id. at 628.
221 Virginian Railways, 300 U.S. at 559.
213
214
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pated in the election. The current Board's proposed rule would
create that very situation by allowing a minority of eligible voters
to determine representation. Chairman Dougherty noted this
incongruity in her dissent to the Board's proposed rule change:
"l[T] he only court ever to rule specifically on the question of
whether the Board has the authority to certify a representative
where less than a majority of the eligible voters participates in
an election found that it did not."2 22
The current Board also supported its proposal with the 1947
opinion of Attorney General Clark, which relied in part on the
legislative history of the RLA.2 2" The Attorney General believed
that the Board had the power to certify a representative in an
election where less than a majority of eligible voters cast ballots,
though the Board in its discretion need not exercise that
power.2 2 4 The Attorney General noted a Senate Report on the
bill, which became the 1934 Amendments to the RLA, that said
"the choice of representatives of any craft shall be determined
by a majority of the employees voting on the question."2 2 1 Such
language might support the current Board's proposed rule, but
the Board and the Attorney General failed to recognize two important points.
First, this statement by Senator Dill was made in the context
of explaining how the new amendments would correct the
problems of carrier interference against employees when choosing their representation.2 2 6 This statement was not made to delineate specific voting procedures, but simply to bolster the idea
that the employees, not the carrier, would get to choose their
representatives.
Second, Senator Dill's statement is not an accurate reproduction of the language actually used in the final bill, which states
that "the majority of any craft or class of employees shall have
the right to determine who shall be representative . . . ."22 The
Board forgets that Attorney General Clark's opinion was drafted
at the request of the sitting NMB in 1947.228 Though the Attorney General opined that the Board had the authority to certify
222 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,753 n.2 (Dougherty, Chairman,
dissenting).
223 Id. at 56,751 (citing 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 541 (1947)).
224 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 541, 544 (1947).
225 Id. at 542 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-1065, at 2 (1934)).
226 See S. REP. No. 73-1065, at 2 (1934).
227 Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187 (1934).
228 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 541.
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elections where less than a majority had participated, the Board
stuck to its precedent and ignored the Attorney General's opinion.229 The Board noted that under the RLA, carriers and their
employees had a duty to maintain labor agreements and settle
disputes efficiently so as not to disrupt interstate commerce, and
the Board ruled that this duty could "more readily be fulfilled
and stable relations maintained by carriers' and employees' representatives by a requirement that a majority of eligible employees cast valid ballots in elections conducted under the Act
before certifications of employee representatives are issued."2 3 0
Thus, in the Board's opinion, stable labor relations required majority participation. This recognition undercuts the current
Board's statement that its majority participation requirement
was made for purely administrative reasons.2 31
The Board and Attorney General Clark argued that the RLA
should be given a construction similar to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).232 The Attorney General
noted that the language of section 9(a) is similar to the language of section 2, Fourth, of the RLA, and that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had interpreted section 9(a) as
allowing representative certification based on a simple majority
of votes cast.2 3 3 However, section 9(a) was enacted after section
2, Fourth, of the RIA, and the language of the NLRA is no less
ambiguous than that of the RLA. 2 34 Given this language ambiguity, it is difficult to see how the NLRA necessarily demands
that a representative should be chosen by a majority of ballots
cast. Rather, the NLRB has interpretedthat language to allow certification based on a simple majority of votes cast.2 35 The NMB
and NLRB are distinct, independent agencies, and if the NLRB
wishes to interpret its enabling statute in that manner, the NMB
is under no duty to follow suit. In fact, to suggest that the NMB
should follow the NLRB's procedure is to undermine the deciId.
Id.
231 See NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,751.
232 Id.; 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 543.
233 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 543.
234 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)
("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
229
230

collective bargaining . . . .").
235

See 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 543.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE

698

[ 75

sional autonomy of the NMB in determining election
procedures.
In her dissent to the NMB's proposed rule change, Chairman
Dougherty notes another important distinction between the
RLA and the NLRA: decertification." 6 Under its authority from
the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board has established
formal procedures that allow employees to decertify their current union representation."3 As discussed in Part III above, the
NMB has no such formal decertification procedure. While it is
possible for a union to lose its certification, as occurred in Alitalia,"* this is a difficult process. Employees do not have the
simple option of petitioning for a decertification election.
The lack of a formal decertification procedure becomes critical when considered in conjunction with NMB Rule 1206.4,
which limits the frequency of applications for investigation into
representative disputes.'
Under that rule, employees or carriers must wait two years after a representative has been certified
to apply for investigation of a representation dispute.2 40 In
other words, employees are stuck with their union for two years.
Under the proposed rule, unions do not have the majority participation hurdle to clear, and certification will likely come more
easily. For those who do not want any form of union representation, two years is a long time to be held to the desires of an
unwanted union.
In its rule change proposal, the Board noted that previous
boards justified the majority requirement based on maintaining
stable labor relations under the RLA.2 4 1 The current Board asserts that this reasoning is inaccurate and that stable labor relations are the result of the NMB's mediation function rather than
its role in certifying employee representatives. 242 The Board
claims that its power to determine mediation duration compels
the parties to compromise their positions and come to agreement, thus obviating the need for strikes.2 4 3 The Board's reasoning is quite specious when one considers the nature of
NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,753 (Dougherty, Chairman, dissenting).
Procedures Guide, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/Procedures
Guide.htm (requiring that 30% of employees have petitioned to have a decertification election) (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
23 Alitalia Airlines/LAM & AW, 10 N.M.B. 331 (1983).
23s 29 C.F.R. § 1206.4 (2010).
24 Id. § 1206.4(a).
241 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,751.
236
237

242

Id.

243

Id. at 56,751-52.
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mediation itself. If successful mediation is responsible for labor
peace, then certification of representatives is the foundation
upon which that mediation success is built. One cannot isolate
mediation from representation certification because successful
mediation cannot occur unless those bargaining have the authority and confidence given by those they purport to represent.
That authority and confidence is granted by employees, and
under the Board's seventy-five year procedure, elected unions
can be confident that their authority is legitimate. Employees
have greater confidence and faith in their elected representatives when they know a majority of employees support representation. The Board's proposed rule threatens to undermine this
confidence. If a union purports to represent employees, a majority of whom did not favor representation, how can that union
be a successful negotiator during mediation, arbitration, or private dispute settlement?
The Board further attempted to justify its rule change by asserting that "labor relations in the air and rail industries have
progressed since the early days of the RLA but many of the
Board's election procedures have not."24 4 The Board noted, as
was discussed in Part II above, that company unions were widespread in the early days of the RLA. Yet, the current election
procedures and the majority participation rule were effective in
breaking those company unions and encouraging interferencefree employee elections. If the current rule was effective, then
the Board fails to explain how better labor relations have made
the rule less effective now. The Board asserted that "[a]ir and
rail labor and management now go to great lengths to encourage employee participation in workplace matters." 24 5 If this
is the case, and employees are participating in greater numbers,
then the majority participation rule serves no hindrance to
those employee groups that truly wish to be represented.
As part of the proposed rule, the Board noted that in future
elections, employees will have the opportunity to vote "no," or
against union representation. 2 6 The Board stated that as part
of the progression of employer and labor relations, employee
participation is strongly encouraged today, and giving employees an affirmative choice against representation furthers that
24

Id. at 56,752.

245

Id.

246

Id.
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participation.2 4 7 However, the current procedure has been in
place for seventy-five years, and if labor and management have
taken greater measures to encourage participation, then is it not
reasonable to conclude that many (if not most) employees are
aware of the effect of their non-participation in an election?
While the Board was right in explaining that employees do not
vote for many reasons-indifference, conscious choice, etc.the Board placed too much emphasis on employee indifference. 2 4 8 If employee participation has increased, then perhaps
the "indifferent" non-voters are truly cognizant of their decision
not to vote and really intend to "vote" against unionization
through their non-participation.
The Board and labor unions condemn the current procedure
as undemocratic because those who do not vote have a role in
determining the outcome of representation elections. 24 9 But
union representation elections are unlike an election for a congressman, president, or the like, whose positions are set up by
constitutions and are necessary for a functioning government.
Unions are not essential to employment in the same way. Furthermore, in elections outside of labor, voters typically have
comfort that elected officials sit for a specific term and often are
constrained by term limits. Labor organizations and unions are
not faced with these dangers. Once a union is certified, its position is indeterminate; it remains the employees' representative
until the Board certifies a different union. 2 10 Given the absence
of formal decertification procedures, employees face the prospect of long-term dissatisfaction and uphill battles to dethrone a
sitting union.
As recently as 2008, the Board itself denied a request to
change election procedures. 2 5 1 The Association of Flight Attendants alleged a representation dispute and the Board authorized an election. 5 The Association requested that the Board
change its ballot to a simple 'Yes/No" ballot, and that the Board
certify the union if it received a simple majority of votes cast.2 5 5
This is exactly the procedure the Board now proposes to use.
But the 2008 Board rejected these requests, holding that "no
247
248
249

250
251
252
253

Id.
See id.
Id.
NMB MANuAL. § 15.1.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 35 N.M.B. 129, 129 (2008).
Id.
Id.

2010]

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD

701

caselaw ... supports an unannounced and extreme departure
from decades of NMB balloting rules and procedures. "254 The
Board continued: "The level of proof required to convince the
Board the changes proposed are essential, then, is quite high,
and has not been met."2 5 5 Ironically, the current Board now
proffers the failed arguments that the Association made to the
2008 Board in its rule change request-employee participation,
the "undemocratic" nature of the election procedure, and results based on non-action. 6 The Board has not shown that labor relations in the airline and rail industries have changed so
much in the year-and-a-half since Delta that a rule change is
necessary.
So what has changed since Delta? Only the makeup of the
Board itself. Board members Harry Hoglander and Linda
Puchala-drafters of the proposal-were appointed by the new
administration under President Obama. 2 57 Both Mr. Hoglander
and Ms. Puchala are former presidents of labor organizations.2 58
Having experience in labor relations is no doubt important and
helpful for members of the Board, but being tied so closely to
the parties that will likely benefit most from a rule change raises
the specter of bias or special treatment. In fact, Chairman
Dougherty expressed this concern: "[It] 'gives the impression
that the Board has prejudged this issue,' and is trying to 'influence the outcome of several very large and important representation cases currently pending."' 2 5 1 Chairman Dougherty's
remarks also illustrate the questionable timing of the NMB's
rule change proposal. The Board proposed the rule change after a request from the Transportation Trades Division of the
AFL-CIO. 2 0 Not coincidentally, the union's request came in the
wake of the Delta and Northwest Airlines merger, where the un-

Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 131 (quoting Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. and the International Bhd. of Teamsters, 14 N.M.B. 347, 363). The Board in Chamber opined:
"Since the Board has a long-standing policy of amending its rules only when required by statute or essential to the administration of the Act, it follows that those
seeking rule changes bear a heavy burden of persuasion." Chamber, 14 N.M.B. at
356.
256 See generally NMB Proposal, supra note 1.
257 Obama Union Rules, supra note 14.
258 Id.
259 Id. (quoting Chairman Dougherty's letter to Congress).
20 NMB Proposal, supra note 1, at 56,752 (Dougherty, Chairman, dissenting).
254
255
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ions have struggled in the new elections because of Delta's lower

unionization rates. 2 6 1
Even if the Board's proposal is not a direct attempt to stack
the deck in favor of unionization, the mere intimation of such
could critically damage the Board's legitimacy, reputation, and
authority. Both carriers and employees enlist the help of the
Board in labor disputes, and both come to the Board with the
expectation that it is a neutral, unbiased, and fair decisionmaker. The Board's power to certify representatives and mediate disputes is critical to maintaining peaceful labor relations.
With the proposed rule, carriers will likely not see the Board as a
neutral party but rather as a union ally. Under the RLA, carriers
have a duty to come to the table and negotiate in good faith, but
carriers are not obliged to enter any agreements with employees
or their unions.26 2 If employers believe a major player in the
game is biased, they have one less reason to come to agreement
with their employees. This is not the environment that the RLA
demands. That Act's purpose is simple: to encourage peaceful
settlement of labor disputes in the railroad and air industries so
that interstate commerce flows smoothly.26 3 The proposed rule
takes a step backwards from that purpose.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Railway Labor Act of 1926 and its later amendments aspired to reduce conflict between labor and management in the
railroad and airline industries. To that end, the Act established
the National Mediation Board which stands as a neutral government agency that helps carriers and employees through its mediation and arbitration services. One of the Board's most
critical duties is the investigation and certification of the employees' union representatives. For seventy-five years, the Board
has conducted its investigation through secret ballot elections
among a carrier's employees, and before certifying a union as a
representative, the Board has required that at least a majority of
eligible employees cast valid ballots in favor of representation.
The Board believed this policy was not only legitimate but necessary because unions could more effectively negotiate labor disputes when they enjoyed the support of a majority of employees.
The Board has faithfully followed this policy, deviating only
261
262
263

Obama Union Rules, supra note 14.
See generally Pub. L. No. 73-442, § 2, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934).
Id.
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when circumstances-such as carrier interference-necessitated
a change in the balloting process. Historically, the judiciary has
afforded the NMB wide deference in carrying out its duties
under the RLA, and successful challenges to the Board's discretion have been few.
The current Board now proposes to adopt a rule changing its
certification procedures so that a majority of eligible voters need
not participate. Rather, the Board will certify any union receiving a majority of valid ballots cast. This change stands to reduce
one of the hurdles to union certification. Statutory and case law
suggest that the Board has the authority to make such a rule
change, but the Board has not adequately justified the need for
the new rule. The Board has not established that employer and
labor relations have changed so dramatically as to necessitate a
rule change. The Board has failed to realize the importance of
representative certification to maintaining stable labor relations.
The Board has failed to show that the current election procedures are "undemocratic." The specter of partisan politics
looms over the Board's proposal and threatens to undermine
the Board's authority and image as a neutral mediator of disputes among carriers and employees. With the Board's authority thus compromised, its effectiveness will suffer, and the goals
of the RLA-encouraging labor peace and reducing interruptions in interstate commerce-will be lost.
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